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Abstract: The institutional analysis and development (IAD) literature finds that 
Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas 
that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, 
Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game 
theory. Here we demonstrate the power of correlated equilibrium (CE) to explain 
lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural 
resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are proce-
durally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value. This modeling 
approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the 
interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-
use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of 
property rights and the structural features of the resource-management institu-
tion. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a power-
ful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural 
resource management.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, governing the commons, inshore artisanal 
fisheries, natural resource management institutions, noncooperative game theory
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1. Introduction
The importance and effectiveness of community-level institutions for the man-
agement of natural resources is now widely recognized. For this and her many 
other contributions to the confluence between political science and economics, 
we are indebted to the late Elinor Ostrom. The institutional analysis and develop-
ment (IAD) literature, as developed by Elinor Ostrom and others, proceeds from 
the empirical observation that noncooperative game theory has limited predictive 
power in this domain. Instead, the required explanatory power is supplied by face-
to-face communication, group identity, trust, legal norms and rules, and social 
customs, conventions and norms (Ostrom 1990, 1998, 2007, 2010; Ostrom et al. 
1994; Cardenas and Ostrom 2004; Janssen and Ostrom 2008).
Yet upon deeper reflection, these empirical findings – that communication and 
other modalities of social coordination induce departures from Nash predictions 
– are in fact to be expected. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does not contain 
a mechanism by which players may coordinate on one particular strategy profile 
among multiple equilibria. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies has no mechanism 
for ‘selecting’ from among multiple equilibria. In contrast, Nash equilibrium in 
mixed strategies is unique, eliminating the equilibrium-selection problem. This 
resolution of the equilibrium-selection problem relies on players randomizing 
their strategy selections independently, with no scope for capturing coordination.
However with appropriate development of game structure, or alternatively 
with appropriate choice of solution concept, non-zero correlation between strate-
gies – that is, coordination – is also consistent with noncooperative game the-
ory. For instance Barany (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Barany 1992) and Forges 
(Forges 1990) show that extending a strategic-form game with 4 or more players 
to include a pre-play period of communication (i.e. cheap talk) yields a Nash equi-
librium in the extended game which corresponds to a correlated equilibrium (CE) 
(Aumann 1974, 1987) of the strategic-form game. Indeed as Kar et al. (2010) 
note, numerous authors have derived answers to variations on the question, “Can 
any correlated equilibrium of a given normal-form game be generated as the equi-
librium outcome of a communication process among the players?” Alternatively, 
the modeler may choose to work directly with the CE solution concept. Both of 
these approaches allow coordination to be explained within the noncooperative 
framework.
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We argue that with tailoring and calibration of game-theoretic model structure 
to specific human-environment systems,1 noncooperative game theory offers a 
powerful and under-appreciated explanatory complement to the IAD literature. 
We demonstrate this explanatory power within the class of community-level 
 natural resource management (NRM) institutions featuring an annual lottery for 
the allocation of fishing sites. Supported by detailed descriptive analysis, the IAD 
literature presents these lottery-allocation institutions as examples of successful 
local-level NRM (Ostrom 1988, 1990, 1998; Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 
et al. 1994). But to date there is no published record of these lottery-allocation 
institutions being explicitly modeled as implementing noncooperative equilibria. 
We show that these local-level institutions are also supported by noncooperative 
game theory. Specifically, we show that the fishing-site lottery institution imple-
ments correlated equilibrium. This modeling approach also reveals the nature of 
the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and the in-use 
characteristics of fishing gear on the one hand, and the degree of formalization 
of property rights and the structural features of the NRM institution on the other 
hand.
We generalize Ostrom et al.’s (1994) assignment game to arbitrary degrees 
of catch displacement induced by fishing site ‘congestion’, and determine, for 
each region of the parameter space, whether the ‘self-enforcing’ requirement of 
correlated equilibrium is satisfied. In fisheries where differences in site-specific 
yields are small, allocation of fishing sites by lottery is self-enforcing in the sense 
that each fisher’s best response is to work his lottery-allocated site given that the 
other fishers do so as well. However, in fisheries where differences in site-specific 
yields are large, lottery allocation is not self-enforcing without additional struc-
tural features. Such additional structural features may take a variety of forms. 
The approach adopted here is empirical and analytical, in that we seek to answer 
the following question: Do the documented instances of community-level lottery-
allocation institutions include structural features to render lottery allocation 
self-enforcing?
We restrict the general assignment game’s parameters to match the char-
acteristics of inshore artisanal fisheries. This is the context in which lottery-
allocation institutions have emerged in the fishing communities of (i) Canada’s 
Newfoundland coast, (ii) the French Mediterranean, (iii) Alanya on the coast 
of Turkey, and (iv) South India and Sri Lanka. In these fisheries, the sites are 
small and are worked daily. Detection of infringement is virtually immediate and 
requires no separate expenditure of effort or resources on monitoring.2
 These 
features – the cost of monitoring approaching zero, the probability of detection 
approaching one, and the discovery time (lag) of infringement approaching zero – 
1
 The latter are also known as social-ecological systems (Ostrom 2009).
2
 This is in contrast to large offshore fishing sites, for which these transaction costs would be con-
siderable.
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keep the transaction costs associated with lottery-allocation institutions very low, 
and thereby make the emergence of the institution possible.
With regard to additional structural features for meeting the self-enforcing 
requirement of correlated equilibrium, the four documented lottery-allocation 
institutions fall into two groups. In the first two cases (the Newfoundland cod-trap 
fishery and the French Mediterranean eel-trap fishery) both the lottery-allocation 
institution as well as the property rights allocated with it are formally underpinned 
(codified) in law. Furthermore, each lottery institution includes a device to attenu-
ate differences between fishers’ expected catches, given that each fisher operates 
two traps allocated by the institution, and thereby reduces the incentive to deviate 
from the lottery-allocated sites. In the second two cases (the Alanya carangrid 
fishery and the South Indian and Sri Lankan shrimp stake-net fisheries) the lottery 
allocation determines the starting positions in a season-long site-rotation system. 
The fishing gear used in these fisheries is flexibly deployed and moved from one 
site to another. This not only opens up the possibility of more diverse and frequent 
infringement activity throughout the season, but also makes the site-rotation sys-
tem possible. The site-rotation system itself has two distinct effects. Firstly, it 
increases the number of infringees that a single infringer transgresses against 
when maintaining a net at a particular site through the rotation.3 This increases 
the cost to the infringer of abandoning his lottery-assigned position in the rotation 
system. Secondly, it equalizes the ex post catch across all participating fishers,4 
even though there may be large differences between site-specific catches.5 Both 
effects reduce the total incentive to deviate from the lottery-assigned position in 
the rotation system.
All four lottery-allocation institutions incorporate features to eliminate the 
private incentive to deviate from the lottery-allocated position, thereby fulfilling 
the self-enforcing requirement of correlated equilibrium.
3
 In an institution without rotation, an infringer moves his net to a better site and transgresses against 
the single fisher who was legitimately allocated that site. Even if the infringer maintains his net at 
that site for the rest of the season, the count of the number of fellow fishers he has infringed against 
remains at ‘1’. In an institution with rotation, the infringer who abandons his allocated site for a better 
site infringes against that day’s legitimate site fisher. If the infringer maintains his net at the same site 
the following day, he infringes against that day’s legitimate site fisher (who is one position ‘behind’ 
the previous day’s legitimate fisher in the rotation order). With every additional day, the infringer 
infringes against yet another one of his fellow fishing-community members.
4
 This holds if all fishers maintain their gear to the same standard, have the same level of skill, and 
exert the same level of effort at each site (though not necessarily the same level of effort across 
sites). Clearly, differences in ex post catch will emerge if there are differences in gear maintenance, 
skill or effort. Since each fisher’s total ex post catch is increasing in these variables, each fisher has 
an incentive to attend to these variables up to equalization of marginal benefit with marginal cost. 
Importantly, rotation preserves this incentive effect that would be lost if the ex post equalization were 
implemented by catch pooling.
5
 This ex post equalization property is predicated on the absence of significant intra-season variation 
in the yield between sites that is not suppressed by the averaging induced by the daily site increments 
of the rotation system.
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The lessons of Elinor Ostrom’s work and of the IAD literature spawned from 
it are not only apt, but crucial: community-level institutions for NRM arise out 
of local, particularistic, often interdependent details, exploiting and being tied 
to specific features of the local ecology, geography, technology, and social and 
political structures. This also remains the case when seeking to apply noncoop-
erative game theory to explain the emergence and persistence of community-level 
institutions for NRM. In the present analysis a collection of particularistic features 
prove crucial to defining game structure, ranging from the geography of the fish-
ery, the size and spacing of fishing sites, to the nature of the fishing gear and its in-
use characteristics. The institutions for NRM reflect and exploit these exogenous 
features with further, endogenously determined structural features, that individu-
ally reduce and jointly eliminate private incentives to deviate from the fishing 
location(s) assigned by the lottery draw.
The primary contributions of this paper lie in developing a novel application 
of CE and in drawing out the consequences of this application for re-establishing 
a role for noncooperative game theory in understanding community-level NRM 
institutions. This is a tentative first step moving beyond the Harsanyi-Selten 
received view (see epigraph). Furthermore, the analysis also carries implications 
for the theoretical framing of equity and fairness more generally. In the pres-
ent analysis, devices that reduce differences between fishers’ catches serve the 
function of rendering the lottery allocation self-enforcing. Equity and fairness 
thus have instrumental value in supporting the emergence of Pareto efficient non-
cooperative correlated equilibrium institutions in the place of Pareto inefficient 
coordination-free institutions.
The sequel is organized as follows. Section 2 presents correlated equilibrium 
and relationship with Nash equilibrium. Section 3 presents Ostrom et al.’s (1994) 
assignment game and the parameter regions relevant to the self-enforcing condi-
tion. Section 4 introduces a generalization of the assignment game. Section 5 
introduces the lottery-allocation institutions found in the fishing communities of 
Canada’s Newfoundland coast, the French Mediterranean, Alanya on the coast of 
Turkey, and South India and Sri Lanka. Section 6 applies the correlated equilibrium 
solution concept to the assignment game. Section 7 restricts the parameters of the 
assignment game to the inshore fisheries in which lottery allocation is employed, 
and revisits the self-enforcing condition in light of the para meterization. Section 
8 concludes.
2. Preliminaries on correlated equilibrium
The simplest form of correlated equilibrium (CE) employs a publicly observ-
able correlating device.6 A correlating device is a randomization device com-
6
 Luce and Raiffa (1957) provide the earliest published account of tossing a fair coin to decide be-
tween Nash equilibria. “Thus, by correlating their mixed strategies, which is possible with preplay 
communication, the players are able to enlarge their potential payoff set in this game (Luce and 
Raiffa 1957, 116). Aumann (1974) was the first to formally develop the CE solution concept.
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bined with a mapping between device outcomes and players’ strategies. In the 
direct correlating devices considered here, the randomization device’s out-
come ‘assigns’ each player a unique strategy via a one-to-one mapping with 
strategy profiles. The combination of a randomization device and an assign-
ment of strategies, one to each player under each device outcome, is called 
a CE if each player’s best response is to play the strategy assigned to him/
her under the assumption that all other players play their respective assigned 
strategies.





Match 6,2  0,0
Show  0,0  2,6
This game has three Nash equilibria: two pure strategy Nash equilibria 
(Match, Match), (Show, Show) and one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (0.75M, 
0.25M).7
In coordination games such as BoS, players can potentially improve their 
lot if pre-play communication is permitted and they are able to reach a non-
binding agreement as to how to select an equilibrium that is favorable to both. If 
Andy and Beth can agree to condition their strategy choice on the outcome of a 
publicly observable random variable, then they can attain a new equilibrium in 
BoS that is (a) more equitable ex ante than either pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
(PSNE), and (b) a Pareto improvement over the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
(MSNE).
There are an infinite number of different random variables that would serve 
this purpose, but let us focus on ‘the toss of a fair coin’. If Andy and Beth agree 
to choose Match if the coin turns up Heads and Show if the coin turns up Tails, 






Match 0.5  0
Show  0  0.5
This correlated equilibrium is defined by its joint probability distribution over 
the set of strategy profiles pi pi pi pi =( ,  ,  ,  ) (0.5,  0,  0,  0.5).MM SM MS SS  We easily see 
that Andy’s and Beth’s individual payoffs are given by × + × =0.5 6 0.5 2 4.
The pre-play agreement – to choose Match on Heads and Show on Tails – is 
self-enforcing if and only if Andy and Beth construct a ‘lottery’ to choose between 
7
 Andy plays Match with probability 0.75, Beth plays Match with probability 0.25.
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the PSNE (and only between the PSNE).8 Notice that, like the MSNE, the CE is 
symmetric in expectation, but that it delivers much larger expected payoffs and 
game ‘value’ (the sum of expected payoffs) than the MSNE.
If players condition their strategy choices on an observable random event they 
can achieve any payoff profile within (but not outside) the boundary of the set of 
all weighted averages9 between the PSNE and MSNE. This reflects the fact that 
MSNE is a limiting case of CE where the correlation between the players’ mixing 
probabilities is zero, and that in turn PSNE is a degenerate case of MSNE where 
players employ mixing probabilies of zero and one such that they play a single 
‘pure’ strategy with probability one.
Table 1 presents the equilibria, expected payoffs and total game values for 
the different solution concepts. Evolutionary dynamics favor the symmetry of 
MSNE and CE (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). Individual and social concerns 
for fairness accentuate the focus on symmetric equilibria. Moreover, experi-
mental work has shown that CE recommendations are followed when that equi-
librium is payoff-enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria (Duffy 
and Feltovich 2010). Thus, based on game value and symmetry (fairness), 
we expect humans to be non-indifferent between different solution types. It 
is straightforward to show formally that any strictly positive pair of weights 
on symmetry and game value yields a partial order in which CE ranks above 
MSNE and PSNE.
By construction, the definition of NE allows us to determine whether a par-
ticular strategy profile is stable and self-reinforcing, or not. However PSNE alone 
does not provide any guidance as to how players may coordinate on one particu-
lar equilibrium among multiple potential PSNE. In other words, PSNE does not 
solve the equilibrium selection problem. MSNE, as a refinement of PSNE, solves 
precisely this problem – but introduces an efficiency loss in terms of forgone 
‘game value’ i.e. diminished social welfare (see Table 1). In contrast CE solves 
the equilibrium selection problem without sacrificing efficiency, and without 
introducing inequality.
These considerations were overlooked by generations of game theorists 
whose overriding desideratum was theoretical parsimony. More recent genera-
8
 In technical jargon, it is self-enforcing if they restrict the support of the randomization device to 
the set of PSNE.
9
 In technical jargon, the ‘convex hull’.
Table 1: Solutions to the battle of the sexes game.
Solution type Equilibrium  Exp. payoffs  Value
PSNE  (Match, Match)  (6,2)  8
 (Show, Show)  (2,6)  8
MSNE  0.75M, 0.25M  (1.5, 1.5)  3
CE-public  0.5(M, M), 0.5(S, S)  (4,4)  8
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tions of experimental and behavioral game theorists have elevated the concern for 
descriptive validity to be on a par with parsimony. Empirically, inequality matters, 
as does efficiency. From the standpoint of modeling fishers’ behavior in NRM 
institutions10 it is essential to be able to explicitly capture (i) the process of how 
a particular equilibrium is selected, (ii) empirically well-substantiated inequality 
aversion, and (iii) the avoidance of efficiency losses. CE simultaneously satisfies 
these three desiderata, whereas PSNE and MSNE do not.
3. Assignment game
Ostrom et al. (1994) introduce and discuss several NRM games. They formalize 
the problem of choosing a fishing location as a single-stage simultaneous-move 
Assignment Game between Fisher 1 and Fisher 2, each of whom may choose 
between a high-yield fishing location, Site 1, and a comparatively low-yield fish-
ing location, Site 2 (Ostrom et al. 1994, 58–61). This game structure (see Table 2) 
captures the essential characteristics of fishing grounds without open entry, i.e. 
fishing grounds that either (a) are sufficiently remote such that outside fishers find 
it impractical or uneconomical to visit, or (b) are closed to outside fishers through 
formal or informal property rights.
If only one fisher chooses Site 1, it yields an annual catch value of v1 > 0 in 
monetary units ($) net of costs. As this model does not attempt to capture the 
investment decision, the relevant costs here are variable costs, e.g. crew, fuel, and 
contribution to maintenance costs. Similarly, if only one fisher chooses Site 2, it 
yields an annual catch of (net) monetary value v2 > 0. Site 1 is a higher-yield fish-
ing location in that v1 > v2. If both fishers choose Site 1, each receives v1/2. If both 
fishers choose Site 2, each receives v2/2. Solutions to the assignment game hinge 
on the relative magnitudes of the value parameters v1 and v2. Three regions of the 
parameter space are germane.
3.1. Large difference v1/2 > v2
In this region of the parameter space, the assignment game has a unique symmet-
ric pure-strategy equilibrium: it is the dominant strategy of each fisher to choose 
Site 1. For illustration, consider v1 = 14 and v2 = 6 so that 14/2 > 6.
10
 As opposed to game theory instructors in abstract, context-free, application-remote stylized games.




Site 1  Site 2
Site 1  v1/2, v1/2  v1, v2





Site 1  Site 2
Site 1  7, 7  14, 6
Site 2  6, 14  3, 3
Site 1 yields more regardless of what the other fisher chooses. Hence (Site 1, 
Site 1) is the unique dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE). However the NRM 
dilemma of Pareto inefficiency persists in this solution, in that the total value of 
the fishery under the DSE is lower than under either of the asymmetric strategy 
profiles (Site 1, Site 2) and (Site 2, Site 1).
3.2. Borderline v1/2 = v2
Along this knife-edge locus of parameters, the assignment game has three weak 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). For illustration, consider v1 = 12 and v2 = 6 
so that 12/2 = 6.
Fisher 1  
 
Fisher 2
Site 1 Site 2
Site 1  6, 6  12, 6
Site 2  6, 12  3, 3
(Site 1, Site 1) is a weak DSE, while (Site 1, Site 2) and (Site 2, Site 1) are PSNE. 
The PSNE on the minor diagonal avoid the NRM dilemma in that the value of the 
game is maximized and the solution is Pareto efficient. They are, however, strongly 
asymmetric, which may make them unstable or fragile equilibria ‘in the field’.
Consideration of this game’s mixed strategy equilibrium yields a degenerate 
‘mixed strategy’ where Site 1 is played with probability 1. This is simply the DSE, 
which yields a total expected value for the game (summed across both fishers) of 
12. For this MSNE-DSE solution, the NRM dilemma remains.
3.3. Small difference v1/2 < v2
In this region of the parameter space, the assignment game has two asymmetric 





Site 1 Site 2
Site 1  4, 4  8, 6
Site 2  6, 8  3, 3
It remains an open question as to how the fishers coordinate on one or other 
of these equilibria. Yes, these are stable equilibria once the fishers are simultane-
ously considering the same equilibrium, but how do they arrive at considering one 
or other of these equilibria in the first place?
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A unique solution is obtained with the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
(MSNE) concept. Each fisher leaves the other indifferent between his/her strat-
egies by choosing Site 1 with probability 5/7 and Site 2 with probability 2/7. 
Each fisher’s expected payoff under this MSNE is 36/7 = 5.14 < 6, and the sum 
of the expected values is thus 72/7 = 10.29. Notice that we have gained unique-
ness and symmetry in moving from the PSNE to the MSNE, but the total value 
of the game’s solution has dropped from 14 to 10.29. In the sequel it will be 
seen that uniqueness, symmetry and Pareto efficiency can be achieved with a 
CE solution.
4. General assignment game
In the interest of expositional simplicity, the structure of Ostrom et al.’s (1994) 
assignment game reflects a particular assumption concerning the displacement 
effect of congestion at a fishing Site. Specifically, the fisher retains the amount 
vi/ni of the potential catch vi at Site i∈{1, 2}, where ni∈{1, 2} is the number of 
fishers at that site.
More generally, the displacement effect of congestion is a function of the area 
of the fishing site ai∈R+ (m2 units), the area requirements of the fishing gear being 
used gi∈R+ (m2 units), as well as the number of fishers at that site ni. We define 
the general retention factor with the function ri = r(ai, gi, ni) that maps onto the 
closed interval between zero and one ri: R+ × R+ × {1, 2} → [0, 1]. This retention 





( ,  ,  ) 0i i i
i






( ,  ,  ) 0i i i
i
r a g n
g
 (2)
=( ,  ,  1) 1i ir a g  (3)
< <0 ( ,  ,  2) 1i ir a g  (4)
The retention factor is increasing with the area of the fishing site (1) and decreas-
ing with the area requirement of the fishing gear in use (2). When a fisher is alone 
at a fishing site, the retention factor is unity as per equation (3), and when a fisher 
at a fishing site is joined by a second fisher, the retention factor is diminished as 
captured by inequality (4). Where ai grows large while gi becomes small, r(ai, 
gi, 2) → 1. This is the case for large offshore fishing areas. Conversely where ai 
becomes small relative to gi, r(ai, gi, 2) → 0. This is the case for small inshore fish-
ing sites and trap berths. The general assignment game in Table 3 captures both of 
these extremes, along with all intermediate cases including Ostrom et al.’s (1994) 
ri = 0.5 specification, when reformulated in terms of this retention factor.
558 Kim Kaivanto
The results set out in Section 3.1 apply to the general assignment game with 
parameters (v1, v2, r1) satisfying the ‘large difference’ criterion r1v1 > v2. Similarly, 
the ‘borderline’ and ‘small difference’ results of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 apply to 
parameter combinations r1v1 = v2 and r1v1 < v2 respectively.
5. Property rights allocation by lottery
A lottery may be used not merely to suggest fishing sites, but to assign property 
rights to fishing sites (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). For instance, since the 1600s 
the French Mediterranean prud’homie guilds of the Languedoc-Roussillon region 
have used an annual lottery system to allocate access and extraction rights to fish-
ing grounds (Frangoudes 2001; CRPMEM–Languedoc–Roussillon 2007; Grieve 
2009). In Sri Lanka (Negombo Estuary) and the Indian States of Tamil Nadu (Pulicat 
Lake) and Kerala (Vallarpadam), the Padu system of community-based fisheries 
management employs a yearly lottery to allocate the starting positions in a stake-
net rotation scheme for shrimping (Mathew 1991; Alexander 1995; Amarasinghe 
et al. 1997; Panini 2001; Lobe and Berkes 2004; Coulthard 2008, 2011). Prior to 
2005 – by which time decades of tourism development ultimately displaced fish-
ing completely – the fishers of Alanya, Turkey, allocated the season’s starting net 
fishing positions in a site rotation system by drawing lots in a coffee house before 
the beginning of the carangrid migration season (Berkes 1986). And prior to the 
cod-fishing moratorium introduced in 1992, inshore cod-fishing communities of 
Newfoundland allocated cod-trap berths through an annual community-organized 
draw (Dunne 1970; Faris 1972; Martin 1973, 1979; Phyne 1988, 1990; Matthews 
1993; Dunne 2011). These lotteries allocate a fixed-term form of property rights 
– territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) – covering both access rights and with-
drawal rights at designated fishing sites. In the Newfoundland inshore cod fishery 
and the Languedoc-Roussillon eel fishery, both the TURF as well as the institution 
for its allocation are formally codified in law. In the Alanya carangrid fishery and 
the Indian and Sri Lankan shrimp fishery, both the TURF as well as the institution 
for its allocation enjoy legitimacy, but not full formal legal codification.
Fishers assigned TURF by lottery take varying levels of initiative and per-
sonal responsibility for patrolling and defending their property rights. Illegitimate 
(infringing) lines, nets or traps may be cut. Violating vessels may be identified and 
reported, or more confrontationally, driven off. Such confrontations may escalate 
from verbal exhortations through to, in the extreme, physical contact.




Site 1  Site 2
Site 1  r1v1, r1v1  v1, v2
Site 2  v2, v1  r2v2, r2v2
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The probability of detecting TURF infringement depends on the size of the 
fishing area, the speed of the fishing vessel, the resources expended in monitoring, 
and the type of fishing technique in use. For a given level of monitoring effort, 
the probability of detecting infringement is lower for larger offshore fishing areas 
than for smaller inshore net sites and trap berths. For inshore sites and berths, 
monitoring can be costless and 100% effective.
This is the case in the Languedoc-Roussillon eel fishery, Alanya coastal 
carangrid fishery, the Newfoundland inshore cod fishery, and the Padu stake-net 
shrimp fisheries of southern India and Sri Lanka. In the Languedoc-Roussillon eel 
Prud’homies, the eel traps function in pairs set by two different fishers, and these 
two fishers aid and discipline each other. To match eel movement patterns, traps 
are inspected every two days during the waiting phase, and then emptied daily 
during the eel movement phase. If an outside fisher sets up a trap in the site, this is 
detected costlessly and effectively, immediately. In the pre-2006 Alanya seasonal 
carangrid fishery, the closely-spaced inshore fishing sites were worked daily, so 
interlopers were detected immediately and costlessly. Infringers were dealt with 
by the community in the coffee house, “sometimes with the threat of violence” 
(Berkes 1986, 222). In the pre-1992 Newfoundland inshore cod fishery, traps 
were hauled (i.e. emptied) twice per day, so monitoring was accomplished cost-
lessly in the course of normal hauling, achieving 100% detection rate. There is 
evidence that direct confrontation between fishers was avoided, and that instances 
of infringement were notified to the Federal Fisheries Officer, who would act as 
an impartial mediator in resolving the dispute (Martin 1973, 1979; Phyne 1990). 
In the stake-net lines of the Negombo Estuary (Sri Lanka), Pulicat Lake (Tamil 
Nadu, Indian State of) and Vallarpadam (Kerala, Indian State of) fishers are in 
even closer proximity to each other than in Alanya. Failure to comply with the 
allocated position in the rotation scheme is noticed not only by one other fisher 
(the infringee), but fishers to the left and right as well. Consequently detection 
of infringers is immediate and costless. Disputes that fail to be resolved infor-
mally are taken to the elected leaders of the relevant sangham (fisher’s ‘society’ 
or ‘association’) who act as arbitrators (Lobe and Berkes 2004).
6. CE of the assignment game
CE solutions may be symmetric or asymmetric, but payoff-dominant CEs offer 
symmetric ex ante payoffs – i.e. symmetric payoffs in expectation prior to the 
realization of the randomization device – and improve the total expected value of 
the game over that obtainable with MSNE.
Consider the three parameter regions presented above. Let us take these in 
reverse order, beginning with the small-difference case.
6.1. Small difference
Consider an assignment – either (Site 2, Site 1) or (Site 1, Site 2) – achieved 
with the toss of a fair coin. This induces the joint probability distribution 
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(π11, π12, π21, π22) = (0, 0.5, 0.5, 0) on the strategy space. Upon the realization 
of Heads, Fisher 1 is assigned Site 2 and Fisher 2 is assigned Site 1; the assign-




Site 1  Site 2
Site 1  4, 4 (π11 = 0) 8, 6 (π12 = 0.5)
Site 2  6, 8 (π21 = 0.5) 3, 3 (π22 = 0)
This correlated assignment of fishing Sites is self-enforcing. Note that the 
assignment game payoff matrix has not been modified in any way to account 
for fisher-specific property rights (TURF) or the monitoring thereof. Here where 
the difference in bountifulness between the two Sites is small (v1/2 < v2), the 
assignment game has a fishery value-enhancing CE solution in the absence of 
fisher-specific property rights.
Fisher 1’s best response to Fisher 2 taking up Site 1 is to fish in Site 2 (6 > 4), 
consistent with his assigned fishing site under Heads. In turn, Fisher 2’s best 
response to Fisher 1 taking up Site 2 is to fish in Site 1 (8 > 3), consistent with his 
assigned fishing site under Heads. Due to the symmetry of the payoff matrix, the 
assignment of fishing sites under Tails is similarly self-enforcing.
The ex ante expected payoffs under this CE solution are symmetrically 7 for 
each fisher. Moreover, the total expected value of the game under this CE solu-
tion is 14, which is an improvement over the 10.29 achieved under the (similarly 
symmetric) MSNE.
With reference to the general assignment game in Table 3, this small differ-
ence case is where r1v1 < v2. Under the CE solution, the total value (the sum of 
the expected payoffs of both players together) of this small difference case of the 
general assignment game is (v1 + v2), which is Pareto efficient.
Here the CE achieved with a symmetrical lottery mechanism increases the 
total value of the fishery. This aspect of the allocation of fishing sites by lot-
tery is an upshot of the CE formulation, and provides a novel insight into why 
fishing communities adopt lottery mechanisms. Not only do fishing communities 
improve ex ante equity and fairness by adopting a lottery-allocation mechanism, 
but they also increase the total value of the fishery. And in the small difference 
(r1v1 < v2) case, neither formal nor informal property rights are needed to underpin 
the CE solution.
6.2. Borderline
As in the small-difference case, here in the borderline case v1/2 = v2 (in gen-
eral r1v1 = v2) the CE is self-enforcing without the need to introduce property 
rights and the associated costly monitoring and defense of TURF. For this locus 
of parameters, the CE solution using a public randomization device (e.g. a lottery) 
improves the value of the fishery over that achievable under the NRM-dilemma-
plagued DSE. The CE solution does not increase the total value of the fishery over 
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the non-unique PSNE, but it substitutes a strongly ex ante asymmetric allocation 
with an allocation that is ex ante symmetric.
Again we employ a symmetrical lottery between the minor diagonal strategy 
profiles (Site 2, Site 1) and (Site 1, Site 2) with the payoffs (6, 12) and (12, 6) 




Site 1  Site 2
Site 1  6, 6 (π11 = 0)  12, 6 (π12 = 0.5)
Site 2  6, 12 (π21 = 0.5)  3, 3 (π22 = 0)
Inspection of the payoff matrix confirms that neither fisher has an incentive to 
deviate from his/her assigned fishing site under either Heads or Tails. The strat-
egy assignments are thus self-enforcing, which confirms the 50%–50% lottery 
between (Site 2, Site 1) and (Site 1, Site 2) as constituting a CE.
The total value of the fishery under this unique ex ante symmetric CE solution 
is 18, which equals the total value of the fishery under the ex ante asymmetric and 
non-unique weak PSNE solutions (18), but constitutes an increase over the value 
of the fishery under the symmetric DSE solution (12).
In the notation of the general assignment game in Table 3, the value of the 
fishery in this borderline case (r1v1 = v2) is v1 + v2.
6.3. Large difference
A publicly observable randomization device is not in itself sufficient to ensure a 
self-enforcing CE in this region of the general assignment game parameter space 
where the high-yield Site is more than 11r
−
 times as bountiful as the low-yield Site. 
Here the existence of a CE lottery solution requires property rights, and hinges 
crucially on the costs and effectiveness of monitoring and defending TURF. Here, 
the outcome of the lottery not only coordinates fishers’ site choices, but allocates 
property rights to each fisher. The payoff matrix of the general assignment game 
changes with the introduction of property rights and the associated monitoring 
actions undertaken by the TURF holders.
Firstly, we distinguish between legitimate fishing at Site 1 and illegitimate 
fishing at Site 1. Secondly, illegitimate fishing at Site 1 may be either undetected 
or detected by the legitimate Site 1 fisher. Thirdly, detection is neither automatic 
nor deterministic, but probabilistic. The probability of detection pd ∈  [0, 1] is 
a function of the area of the fishing site a1∈R+ (m2), the area requirements of 
the fishing gear g1 ∈ R+ (m2), the speed of the legitimate Site 1 fishing vessel 
s1 ∈ R+ (km/h), and the level of resources (fuel, crew hours) devoted to monitor-
ing m1 ∈ R+ ($) by the legitimate Site 1 fisher. Thus the probability of detecting 
the illegitimate fisher is given by the function pd = pd(a1, g1, s1, m1) that maps onto 
the closed interval between zero and one 
= +× →
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The probability of detection is decreasing with the area of the fishing site (5) and 
is increasing with the area requirements of the fishing gear (6), the speed of the 
legitimate fisher’s vessel (7), and the resources devoted to monitoring (8). This 
function embraces cases where the area of the fishing site a1 is very large relative 
to the values of g1, s1 and m1, whereby the probability of detection becomes very 
small pd → 0, all the way through to cases where the area of the fishing site is 
small relative to the values of g1, s1 and m1, whereby the probability of detection 
becomes large pd → 1.
The assignment game with property rights (see Table 4) combines the distinc-
tion between legitimate and illegitimate Site 1 fishing with probabilistic detection 
of illegitimate fishing. Within the current single-stage assignment game frame-
work, the fisher who is detected in illegitimate Site 1 fishing is sent back to port 
with a payoff of zero – due to having his net or trap line cut, due to being ‘driven 
off’, or due to the fishing community (or an official of the state) enforcing TURF. 
This is how, in the present single-stage game, we operationalize property rights. 
Conversely, the illegitimate Site 1 fisher will remain undetected with probability 
(1 − pd), retaining the illegitimate catch of r1v1.
As a1 and g1 are present in both the detection probability pd and the reten-
tion factor r1 functions, these variables drive a comonotonic relationship between 
(1 − pd) and r1. Holding s1 and m1 constant, (1 − pd) → 1 as r1 → 1 and respec-
tively (1 − pd) → 0 as r1 → 0. Since our present interest is not in the fishing-vessel 
investment decision, the speed variable s1 may be viewed as exogenous along 
Table 4: Assignment game with property rights: (a) Fisher 1 draws Site 1; (b) Fisher 1 draws 
Site 2.
(a) F1: S1, F2: S2  
 
(b) F1: S2, F2: S1
F1 
 
F2 F1  
 
F2
S1 – illegit  S2 S1  S2
S1 r1v1 − m1, (1 − pd)r1v1 v1 − m1, v2  S1 – illegit (1 − pd)r1v1, r1v1 − m1 v1, v2
S2 v2, v1  r2v2, r2v2  S2  v2, v1 − m1  r2v2, r2v2
Community-level natural resource management institutions 563
with the given characteristics of the fishery a1 and g1. The remaining variable, m1, 
is an endogenous choice variable of the legitimate Site 1 fisher, and affects not 
only the illegitimate Site 1 fisher’s payoff through the detection probability, but 
also the legitimate Site 1 fisher’s payoff r1v1 − m1.
Within this payoff structure of the assignment game with property rights a 
public randomization device can induce a self-enforcing CE with a 50%–50% lot-
tery between the (F1:S1, F2:S2) assignment and the (F1:S2, F2:S1) assignment.
This induces a self-enforcing CE when Fisher 2 (symmetrically Fisher 1) has 
no incentive to deviate from the allocated fishing site. Thus the self-enforcing 
condition has two components. In the (F1:S1, F2:S2) assignment the self-enforc-
ing condition on Fisher 1 is
 
− >1 2 2 1,v r v m  (9)
while the self-enforcing condition on Fisher 2 is
 








Again due to the ‘large difference’ condition r1v1 > v2 > 0, the ratio term in (11) is 




 ensuring that pd ∈ (0, 1). The greater the yield disparity 
between Site 1 and Site 2, the greater the probability of detection pd needs to be 
in order to ensure that the lottery allocation is self-enforcing. In (10) the inequal-
ity is satisfied for ‘small enough’ values of (1 − pd)r1. As noted above, a1 and g1 
underpin a comonotonic relationship between (1 − pd) and r1, and so the self-
enforcing condition in (10) is satisfied for fisheries with a1 small enough relative 
to g1. Similarly, the resources that the legitimate Site 1 fisher commits to monitor-
ing m1 also affect pd.
Ultimately, a precise answer to whether the self-enforcing conditions are sat-
isfied turns on the specific functional forms of the retention factor r(ai, gi, ni) and 
the probability of detection pd(a1, g1, s1, m1) along with the specific exogenous 
parameter values a1, g1 and s1 of the fishery and the endogenously determined 
optimal value of m1.
However empirical research has not yet advanced to the point where specific 
functional forms for r(ai, gi, ni) and pd(a1, g1, m1) are known. Fortunately, the self-
enforcing condition may be evaluated directly for the inshore artisanal fisheries 
discussed in Section 5.
7. Parameter restrictions to inshore artisanal fisheries
The fisheries employing lottery schemes for the allocation of fishing sites all share 
a number of common characteristics (see Section 5). They are inshore fisheries 
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rather than offshore fisheries. The yield of the best fishing sites is more than two-
fold that of the worst. The fishing sites are small relative to the area require-
ments of the fishing gear. And illegitimate fishing attempts (TURF violations) are 
detected immediately and within the course of normal fishing routines, removing 
the need to expend resources on the monitoring of property rights. These charac-
teristics entail particular restrictions on the parameters of the assignment game 
with property rights (see Table 4).
But there are also differences among lottery-allocation fisheries. The most 
consequential difference concerns the nature of the physical, technical, and oper-
ating characteristics of the fishing gear itself. The fisheries based on portable and 
easily re-deployable fishing gear are also those fisheries that employ a rotation 
system without formal legal underpinning to the lottery-allocation mechanism. 
Calibration to portable fishing gear and rotation of fishing sites offers a CE-based 
explanation for the absence of (the need for) legal codification of the lottery-
allocation mechanism in these fisheries.
7.1. Parameters
Restriction 7.1 The detection probability pd is in B(1; δp ), the δp-neighborhood 
of 1.
δ δ= ∈(1; ) { [0,  1] | ( ,  1) < }p d d pB p d p
Since the lottery-allocated fishing sites of Newfoundland, Alanya, the French 
Mediterranean, South India and Sri Lanka are only large enough for effective 
exploitation with a single net or trap, d(pd, 1), the difference between the prob-
ability of detection and 1, is arbitrarily small. That is, δp is arbitrarily small.
Restriction 7.2 The cost of monitoring m1 is in B(0; δm ), the δm-neighborhood of 0.
δ δ+= ∈ <R1 1(0; ) { | ( ,  0) }m mB m d m
Since detection of TURF violators is accomplished in the course of normal tending 
of traps and nets in the lottery-allocated fishing sites of Newfoundland, Alanya, 
the French Mediterranean, South India and Sri Lanka, d(m1, 0), the difference 
between the cost of monitoring m1 and 0, is arbitrarily small. In other words, δm 
is arbitrarily small. With m1 calibrated in this fashion, the legitimate Site 1 fisher 
does not dissipate the surplus of Site 1 on monitoring TURF.
Restriction 7.3 The retention factor r1 is in B(0; δr ), the δr-neighborhood of 0.
δ δ= ∈ <1 1(0; ) { [0,  1] | ( ,  0) }r rB r d r
Whereas detection probability pd is a decreasing function of the disparity between 
the size of the allocated fishing area a1 and the area requirement of the fishing gear 
g1, the retention factor r1 in parameter Restriction 7.3 is an increasing function of 
the disparity between a1 and g1. Since the lottery-allocated fishing Sites are small 
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relative to the area requirements of the fishing gear in Newfoundland, Alanya, the 
French Mediterranean, South India and Sri Lanka, d(r1, 0), the difference between 
the retention factor r1 and 0 is small. Nevertheless the supremum δr of this differ-
ence need not be arbitrarily small.
7.2. In the presence of formally codified property rights
In the Newfoundland cod-trap fishery and the French Mediterranean eel fishery, 
the fisher community’s exclusive rights to defined fishing territory and the alloca-
tion of community fishers to particular fishing sites by lottery are underpinned by 
formal legal codification. For these cases, the parameter restriction 7.2 entails that 
Fisher 1’s self-enforcing constraint (9) holds, while the parameter restrictions 7.1 
and 7.3 entail that Fisher 2’s self-enforcing constraint (10) holds – and therefore 
the lottery-allocation constitutes a correlated equilibrium.
However, the lottery-allocation institutions of Newfoundland and the French 
Mediterranean also include devices to attenuate differences between fishers’ 
expected catches. The cod-trap committees of Newfoundland employed two 
draws, where the first draw was for the ‘prime berths’, and the second was for 
the next-best class of berths.11 In the lotteries for eel trap sites of the Languedoc-
Roussillon Prud’homies, each fisher draws a number. In the first round, the fisher 
who draws the number 1 chooses from among the available trap sites first. The 
fisher who draws the number N, where N is the total number of participating fish-
ers, chooses last from among the available trap sites. In the second round the order 
is reversed: the fisher with the number N chooses first, while the fisher with the 
number 1 chooses last.
7.3. In the absence of formally codified property rights
Whereas the Newfoundland inshore cod fishery and the French Mediterranean eel 
fishery employ not-easily-moved traps that are set in a fixed berth for the duration 
of the season, the Alanya carangrid fishery and the South Indian and Sri Lankan 
shrimp fisheries employ a rotation system made possible by portable nets. In these 
latter fisheries – in which formal legal codification of property rights is absent – 
the position allocated by lottery pertains only to the starting position on the first 
day of the season. On each subsequent day the positions are shifted by one incre-
ment in a predetermined direction. Thus the distinction between fisheries employ-
ing formal legal codification and those which do not extends to differences in the 
properties of the fishing gear and the operating practices required for achieving 
efficiency with this gear.
The general assignment game structure is not directly applicable to fisheries 
composed of closely spaced sites worked with portable fishing gear that may be 
removed, relocated, and re-set – conveniently and economically – on a daily basis. 
11
 The best N berths were collected into the first draw, where N is the number of eligible fishers. The 
next-best N berths were collected into the second draw.
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This flexibility reflects not only the technical and physical characteristics of the 
gear itself, but also derives from the particular characteristics of efficient operat-
ing practice with the gear.
In a fishery with considerable differences between the yields of different 
fishing sites, relocation flexibility lowers the threshold for opportunistic gam-
ing of fishing sites. The combination of lottery allocation with rotation elegantly 
resolves the problem of continual gaming of fishing sites within the season and 
the associated fishery value-decreasing costs. Before we turn our attention to the 
multi-fisher, multi-site case, let us first develop intuition with a minimal augmen-
tation of the assignment game to include rotation.
In this modified assignment game with rotation (see Table 5), each fisher has 
two new strategies. S12: fish at Site 1 in the first half of the season and fish at Site 2 
in the second half of the season. S21: fish at Site 2 in the first half of the season and 
fish at Site 1 in the second half of the season. When asymmetrically matched as 
(S12, S21) or (S21, S12), these strategy profiles constitute a ‘rotation system’ in this 
pared-down 2-player, 2-site game. In both rotation strategy profiles each fisher 
completes the season having appropriated 1/N (i.e. half) of the annual yield from 
each fishing site. Therefore payoffs under the rotation system are not only sym-
metric ex ante, but also symmetric ex post when within-season yield variation 
between sites is absent.
The rotation system involves continual contact, coordination, and 
close-proximity work with the other fishers throughout each year’s season. 
Table 5: General assignment game with rotation.
F1  F2
S11  S12  S21  S22
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Characteristically, outward mobility from the community of fishers participat-
ing in the site rotation arrangement is low. Hence a participating fisher will 
spend not only the current season in continual contact, coordination, and close-
proximity work with the same set of fellow fishers, but this peer group will 
remain a fixed accompaniment over the course of an entire productive working 
life as a fisher. ‘Good standing’ within the peer group – inclusive of dimensions 
such as goodwill, trust, and reputation – in general terms reduces a fisher’s oper-
ating and coordination costs.
In generalizing the assignment game to a rotation system comprised of i ∈ {1, 
2, …, I} fishing sites and n ∈ {1, 2, …, N} fishers (I = N), it is necessary to account 
for the costs of deviating from the assigned position in the rotation system. Such 
costs might in principle be accounted for within the retention factor function. 
However in the interest of clarity and explicit consideration of these costs, here 
they will not be ‘netted out’ of the retention factor. Let k denote the index of the 
fishing site k ∈ {1, 2, …, I} that has the highest yield
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vk  (12)
Over a season consisting of N days, when all fishers conform to their lottery-
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where ck(n) is the incremental cost to the infringer – conceived as the present 
economic value of the loss of goodwill, trust and reputation – of the nth infringe-
ment at the high-yield site k. This infringer cost is increasing in the number of 
other fishers infringed upon >′ 0,kc  at a rate that is increasing in the number of 
infringees >′′ 0.kc 12
12
 One way of analytically motivating the convexity of infringer cost – though certainly not the only 
way of doing so – can be gleaned from the combinatorics of coalition formation. Within the inshore 
fishery communities we study here, fishers do not work solely in isolation all the time. Instead, there 
are certain procedures – especially in cases of accident or emergency – where fishers within the 
community rely on each other for help. We can think of infringing upon a fellow fisher as ‘burning 
bridges’ with that fisher, whereby that fisher is
 (a) less likely to acknowledge the infringer to be in good standing with the community, and
 (b) less likely to help the infringer when the infringer has occasion to need help.
Infringing against successive fishers has a cumulative effect within the community. Let 2n − 1 be the 
number of non-empty coalitions among the infringee fishers. Then the infringer cost may be defined 
as ck(n) = 2n − 1, which yields ,  0.k kc c >′ ′′
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The self-enforcing condition of the rotation system assignment game is 
given by
 
( ) ( )−
∈ = ∈
+ − <∑ ∑ ∑1
\ 1
1 1( ) .
N
k i i k i
i I k n i I
v r v c n v
N N
 (15)
The intuition of this condition becomes clear when it is specialized to the 
I = N = 2 case, yielding r1v1 − 2c1(1) < v2. That is, it differs from the 2-fisher 
general assignment game (see Table 3) self-enforcing condition only by the 
infringer-cost term –2c1(1) < 0 appearing on the left-hand side. This infringer 
cost makes it possible for the self-enforcing condition to be satisfied – and cor-
related equilibrium to be supported – in the ‘large difference case’ defined by 
r1v1 > v2. The larger the rotation system becomes in terms of the number of differ-
ent sites and participating fishers, the larger the total infringer cost 1
1
( )N kn c n
−
=
∑  for 
 usurping the high-yield site k becomes. Owing to the convexity of the infringer 
cost in the number of infringees >′′( 0),kc  larger rotation systems can support CE 
in fisheries with a proportionately greater disparity between the yields of different 
sites.
8. Conclusion
Community-level NRM institutions that allocate fishing sites by lottery may be 
understood as effectuating noncooprative correlated equilibria in generalized 
assignment games. The lottery not only achieves procedural fairness and ex ante 
equity (ex post equity in the case of rotation systems), but also increases the total 
value of the fishery over non-correlated (Nash equilibrium) mechanisms.
The present work attempts to re-connect the noncooperative game theoretic 
literature with the IAD literature on community-level NRM institutions. Modest 
conceptual reframing is due on both sides. One of the lessons of Elinor Ostrom’s 
work, and of the IAD literature more broadly, is that an array of different aspects 
of local context are crucial to understanding community-level NRMs. This is also 
true for the application of noncooperative game theory to local NRM, insofar as 
abstraction from contextual features entails overlooking solution-relevant details. 
And whereas direct application of Nash equilibrium fails to predict the empirical 
effects of permitting communication (cheap talk) in NRM games (Ostrom 2010, 
641), this is not tantamount to falsification of noncooperative game theory as a 
whole. Rational noncooperative game play is not uniquely identified with – nor 
defined by – Nash equilibrium. Correlated Equilibrium, which is a noncoopera-
tive solution concept, offers precisely the facility required to represent coordina-
tion arising out of cheap-talk communication.
The present application of correlated equilibrium indicates that there is also 
scope for the experimental literature on social and NRM dilemmas to be revisited. 
However the flexibility and adaptability of correlated equilibrium, which reflect 
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its generality as a solution concept, also reduce the crispness of the hypotheses 
that may be derived from it. The correlated equilibrium solution concept does not 
stipulate a specific form of objective function to be optimized in order to identify 
the correlated joint distribution over strategy profiles. Indeed a large variety of 
objective functions – e.g. ranging from social welfare to utilitarian, libertarian 
or egalitarian objective functions – are equally legitimate, and it is not clear that 
any one objective function may be singled out on a priori grounds. Rather than 
merely revisiting the data of existing experiments, new experiments are required, 
building upon the auspicious start in Duffy and Feltovich (2010), that manipulate 
directly the objective function employed by experimental subjects in social and 
NRM dilemmas.
The usefulness of CE as a formal lens through which to understand coordina-
tion in NRM extends beyond explicit lottery-allocation institutions and inshore 
fisheries. For instance Lansing and Miller (2005) present a game-theoretic model 
which distils the essential structure of the rice-planting-timing problem of Balinese 
subak communities. This game features two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, but the 
formal theory of Nash equilibrium is silent on which of these two equilibria will 
obtain. For a millennium, this coordination problem has been resolved through 
an elaborate system of water temples and associated rituals. In the Indian Icaka 
variant of the luni-solar calendar used by the Balinese, the relationship between 
months and observed seasons fluctuates, with the result that “the man in the rice 
field is seldom sure exactly which month it is” (Lansing 1987, 331). There is 
considerable calendar uncertainty, not only in absolute terms, but also in relative 
terms between subak communities: “Well, it may be the tenth month down there, 
but around here it’s still the ninth month!” (Lansing 1987, 331). This uncertainty 
is resolved in an annual water-temple ritual gathering, which allows the subak 
to coordinate the commencement of their first planting season. From a formal 
standpoint, attending the annual water-temple ritual meeting serves the function 
of observing the realization of a randomization device to effectuate correlated 
equilibrium. As Leeson (2014) has shown for the social institution of oracles, the 
absence of a physical randomization device does not preclude the formal prop-
erties of correlated equilibrium from being satisfied, nor does it preclude atten-
dant insight into the noncooperative-game-theoretic role of the operative social 
institutions.
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